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SHARES OF WATER STOCK IN UTAH: PERSONAL PROPERTY
OR REAL ESTATE?
Michael P. Affleck*
Abstract
Utah deserts supply the state with exquisite beauty and are a
definitive part of Utah’s identity. However, a consequence of this arid
beauty is aridity itself. Because Utah is one of the driest states in the
nation, water is an important resource. Accordingly, Utah legislators have
enacted statutes that ensure that those who own water will use it
beneficially and that ownership of water can be transferred easily from
one owner to another. Water ownership is categorized as either ownership
of a water right or a share of water stock. This Note focuses on the need
for a resolution in Utah law regarding the transfer of shares of water
stock. Under Utah statutes, shares of water stock transfer as securities
according to the principles of Utah’s Uniform Commercial Code.
However, Utah courts have ignored these statutes and have applied
judicially made rules in an ad hoc manner to determine whether the shares
of stock in question should transfer as securities or as real property. This
Note advocates that Utah courts should acquiesce to the Utah Legislature
and hold that shares of water stock are transferred per the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Utah, the transfer of shares of stock in mutually-owned water companies is
governed by competing laws. Under statutory law, shares of water stock are personal
property and are transferred under the principles of the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code. Under Utah common law, shares of water stock are akin to real property. They
are generally transferred as appurtenances to land, except when the transfer conflicts
with the water company’s articles of incorporation. Therefore, it is unclear how
shares of water stock are transferred. Utah courts should resolve this confusion by
operating within the doctrine of separation of powers required by the Utah
Constitution and acquiesce to the legislative mandate that shares of water stock are
transferred as personal property in accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code.
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II. BACKGROUND
This Note discusses the discrepancies between Utah statutory law and Utah
common law regarding the transfer of water stock. Part II of this Note provides a
background of the doctrine of prior appropriation and how this doctrine influences
the transfer of both water rights and shares of water stock in the western United
States. Next, this Note defines water rights and water stock and the differences
between them. Part III demonstrates how Utah statutory law is impotent regarding
how shares of water stock are transferred because of the Utah Supreme Courts’
inconsistent application of a common law rebuttable presumption to the statutory
mandate regarding these transfers. Part IV discusses the Utah legislature’s
clarification of how water stock is transferred in reaction to the Utah Supreme
Court’s degradation of Utah statutory law. Part V then demonstrates the Utah
Supreme Court’s continued ignorance of the Utah legislature’s mandate that shares
of water stock are transferred under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Part VI
concludes by arguing that the best method to avoid confusion in these transfers and
to remedy the departure from statutory law is for the Utah Supreme Court to follow
the direction of the Utah legislature and hold that transfers of water stock are
governed by Chapter 8 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
A. Prior Appropriation
In the United States, individual states determine how water is allocated within
their boundaries.1 The states west of the 100th meridian allocate water under the
doctrine of prior appropriation.2 Under this doctrine, people obtain a right to use
water by diverting it away from its natural flow and using the water for a beneficial
purpose.3 Thus, a person has the right to use their allotted amount of water, subject
to when they obtained that right in relation to others who draw water from the same
source. In other words, when two people own water rights from the same source of
water, the person who first obtained their water right may draw the entirety of their
water right (subject to the principle of beneficial use—essentially meaning that the
water must be used to cultivate land4) before the subsequent person may access their
allotted amount of water. Thus, in times of drought, subsequent water rights owners

1

Alan Matheson, Jr., Let It Flow: Wading Through Utah’s Instream Flow Statute, 17
UTAH B.J. 18, 18 (2004).
2
Id. The 100th meridian runs north-south roughly dividing down the middle of North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Kevin Krajick, The 100th
Meridian, Where the Great Plains Begin, May Be Shifting, EARTH INST. COLUM. U. (Apr.
11, 2018), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/04/11/the-100th-meridian-where-the-greatplains-used-to-begin-now-moving-east/ [https://perma.cc/93NM-R7RM].
3
Matheson, supra note 1.
4
ANTHONY TARLOCK & JASON ROBINSON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §
5:68 (July 2019).
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may only access their allotted water right if doing so would not deny a prior owner
from accessing their full water rights.
The doctrine of prior appropriation was first adopted in California in 1855, in
Irwin v. Phillips.5 In Irwin, a miner diverted the flow of a stream to lead into his
mining encampment.6 Subsequently, another miner dug a trench in the original
miner’s dam to re-divert the stream to suit the second miner’s needs.7 The first miner
sued the second claiming that the second miner was infringing on the first miner’s
water right by diverting water away from the first miner’s property.8 The Supreme
Court of California ruled in favor of the first miner. Thus, under Irwin, the law
protects the water rights of those who “by prior appropriation, have taken the waters
from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them . . . to
supply the necessities of gold diggers.”9 By so holding, Irwin embraced the Lockean
labor theory principle that the input of labor results in the output of ownership.10 The
Irwin court further held that conflicts regarding access to water “must be decided by
the fact of priority upon the maxim of equity, qui prior est in tempore potior est
injure” (meaning he who is earlier in time is stronger in law).11 The Irwin court
protected the rights of the first miner because he was first to divert the water into his
encampment to aid his mining operation, in other words, he was the first to put the
water to a beneficial use.12 Under Irwin, a person who desires to divert water from
natural sources “must take it as he finds it, subject to prior rights,” so long as the
preceding individual is using the water “for as high, and legitimate a purpose as the
[subsequent water appropriator] seeks to accomplish.”13 Therefore, under the
doctrine of prior appropriation, prior in time is prior in right, so long as the water is
being used for a beneficial purpose.14
As discussed, a prior water appropriator’s right to access their full water right
is dependent on the owner continually using the water for a beneficial use.15 Courts
determine the amount of water required to fulfill a “beneficial use” by analyzing the
“water duties” that are necessary to achieve this use.16 A water duty is the amount
of water “which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably
5

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 140 (Cal. 1855).
Id. at 142.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 146 (Murray, C.J., concurring).
10
See Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506 (Conn. 1871).
11
Irwin, 5 Cal. at 147 (Murray, C.J., concurring).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 790 (Cal. 1921) (“[T]he
respective priorities of each water right should be adjudged, so that, if in the future the supply
falls below the quantity necessary for all, he who has the prior right may have his preferred
right protected.”).
15
Id.
16
TARLOCK & ROBINSON, supra note 4.
6
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required to be applied to any given tract of land for such period of time as may be
adequate to produce therefrom a maximum amount of such crops as ordinarily are
grown thereon.”17 Water duties are restricted to agricultural uses, while the
analogous principle of “system capacity” is used for municipal supplies that
generally serve the public.18
Individuals who hold water rights may lose those rights, or at least have their
allotted amount of water reduced if they stop using their full water duty for a
beneficial use.19 The beneficial use prong has three basic functions. First, it ensures
that water usage is consistent and continual.20 Second, it mandates that ownership of
water is conditioned upon the owner using the water for productive purposes.21
Third, it gives courts the authority to stop wasteful uses of water.22
Accordingly, a senior water rights owner, who has been continually putting her
water rights to beneficial use, will likely not suffer during a drought because she has
the right to access her water duty regardless of the needs of subsequent water rights
owners.23 In other words, the most senior water rights holder will only suffer during
a drought if the natural water level drops below the senior owner’s water duty.
Conversely, successive owners of water rights must curtail their water usage in times
of drought to avoid infringing on senior owners’ rights to divert and beneficially use
their entire water duty.24 In sum, under the doctrine of prior appropriation, a senior
water rights holder, who continually puts their full water duty to beneficial use, will
always have full access to their water duty at the expense of junior owners of water
rights.
B. Utah Water Rights
Beginning in 1852, the territory of Utah granted Utahns water rights through
“county courts” that allocated water rights to individuals based on case-by-case
needs, regardless of priority.25 Utah abandoned the county courts’ water allocation
system by statute in 1880.26 The doctrine of prior appropriation was then adopted
under the Utah Statutes of 1888, which established that the quantity of water needed
to accomplish a beneficial use was appropriated under a “diligence right,” modeled
17

In re Steffens, 756 P.2d 1002, 1005–06 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Farmers Highline
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (Colo. 1954)).
18
TARLOCK & ROBINSON, supra note 4.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 790 (Cal. 1921).
24
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 228, 230 (2015).
25
Water Right Information, UTAH DIV. WATER RTS. (July 19, 2011),
https://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/ [https://perma.cc/2S96-PCWV].
26
Id.
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after the above-discussed principle of water duties.27 To date, the amount of water
an owner may access is still determined by a diligence right, but since 1953,
applicants seeking water rights must apply to appropriate water with the state
engineer to create a new water right.28
Although people who divert and beneficially use water may own water rights,
the actual water that flows through all natural Utah rivers and streambeds is public
property.29 This means that individuals with water rights do not own the water when
it is in its natural riverbeds. Instead, owners of water rights in Utah own the right to
divert (remove from its natural source) and beneficially use water.30 Under Utah law,
water rights are real property31 and are typically appurtenant to the land on which
the water is beneficially used.32
Because Utah water rights are typically appurtenant to land, they are transferred
by deed in the same manner as real estate,33 subject to three exceptions where water
rights may be severed from land and transferred as independent property:
A water right appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of the land
unless the grantor: (i) specifically reserves the water right or any part of
the water right in the land conveyance document; (ii) conveys a part of the
water right in the land conveyance document; or (iii) conveys the water
right in a separate conveyance document prior to or contemporaneously
with the execution of the land conveyance document.34
These exceptions permit sellers to sever appurtenant water from land to increase
flexibility in facilitating the transfer of water rights.35
When real property is transferred, courts presume that the water rights
transferred with the land absent an explicit expression that the water has been
severed from the land.36 Utah Courts have held that water rights are “transferred by
deed in substantially the same manner as real estate, and pass automatically to a
grantee of the land unless expressly reserved.”37 When water rights are not
27

R.L. Knuth, Conveyancing and Collateralizing Utah Water Rights, 12 UTAH B.J. 12,
12 (1999).
28
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (West 2019).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-1 (West 2019).
32
Janice Holben, Alan J. Jacobs, Jack K. Levin & Eric C. Surette, Definition and Nature
of Water Rights and Privileges—As Appurtenant or in Gross, 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 7
(2019).
33
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-10 (West 2019).
34
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(1)(a) (West 2019).
35
Johanna Hamburger, Improving Efficiency and Overcoming Obstacles to Water
Transfers in Utah, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 69, 74 (2011).
36
Id.
37
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, 1220 (Utah 2000).
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mentioned explicitly in a conveyance of land, the conveyance only includes the
water rights that are appurtenant to the land being conveyed—not water rights that
are in gross (meaning that the water right is not annexed or appended to anything
else).38 Whether water rights are appurtenant to land is a question of fact to be
determined by a jury.39
C. Utah Shares of Water Stock
Mutually-owned water companies may also own the rights to access and
beneficially use water.40 Mutually-owned water companies are created when
individual owners of water rights pool their resources together and create a mutuallyowned company.41 The company, in turn, distributes company stock that represents
the shareholders’ rights to access water in a quantity that is proportional to the
amount of company stock owned.42 These shares of stock are the personal property
of shareholders,43 representing the shareholders’ right to divert a diligent right from
the natural water and a corresponding interest in the ditch or canal by which the
water right is transported.44 Therefore, ownership of a share of stock in a mutuallyowned water company is a representation of ownership of a specific water right.45
Shares of water stock in a mutually-owned water company serve a dual
purpose. First, shares of water stock are personal property that represent “an
ownership interest in the mutual irrigation company.”46 However, a stock certificate
in a mutually-owned water company “is not like the stock certificate in a company
operated for profit. Rather, it is a certificate showing undivided part ownership in a
certain water supply.”47 Second, shares of water stock represent real property rights
to water access and use because “each share of stock also represent[s] the right to
water service and the delivery of a definite quantity of water.”48

38

Holben et al., supra note 32.
Id.
40
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6a-611 (West 2019).
41
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-4-102 (West 2019).
42
See id. (“‘Water company’ means a corporation in which a shareholder has the right,
based on the shareholder’s shares, to receive a proportionate share of water delivered by the
corporation.”).
43
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-10 (West 2019).
44
Francis C. Amendola, Joseph Bassano, John J. Dvorske, Glenda K. Harnad, Janice
Holben, Alan J. Jacobs, Stephen Lease, Anne E. Melley, Tom Muskus, Sally J.T. Necheles,
Jeffrey J. Shampo, Eric C. Surette & Susan L. Thomas, Corpus Juris Secundum, 94 C.J.S.
WATERS § 897 (2020).
45
Id.
46
Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Irrigation Institutions in the American West, 25
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 283, 306 (2006).
47
Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1938).
48
Bretsen & Hill, supra note 46, at 307.
39
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Shares of stock in a mutually-owned water company most differ from water
rights in how they transfer. Unlike water rights, which courts presume are
appurtenant to land,49 Utah statutory law mandates that shares of stock in a water
corporation are not appurtenant to land. Under statutory law, “[t]he right to the use
of water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation is not a water right
appurtenant to land.”50 Instead of transferring like real property, shares of water
stock transfer like securities under the procedure set forth in chapter 8 of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code.51 As a security, the transfer of a share of stock in a
mutually-owned water company must transfer in accordance with the company’s
articles of incorporation and bylaws.52
In sum, under Utah statutory law, water rights are real property interests that
transfer as appurtenances to land, unless the three statutory exceptions apply53 or if
the water right is in gross. Alternatively, shares of water stock in a water company
are transferred as securities, regardless of any alleged appurtenant relationship
between the water and the land. These statutory principles should govern how shares
of water stock transfer because in Utah, “where a conflict arises between the
common law and a statute or constitutional law, the common law must yield.”54 Utah
courts, however, have disregarded the statutory principles regulating the transfer of
water stocks.
III. THE DEGRADATION OF UTAH STATUTES MANDATING THAT SHARES
OF WATER STOCK ARE NOT APPURTENANT TO LAND
This section discusses forty years of Utah case law addressing the common
issue of whether shares of water stock were included in land transfers when the real
estate contract made no mention of the shares of stock. Throughout this period,
statutory law mandated that shares of water stock are not appurtenances to land and
therefore are not included in land transfers unless the sales contracts explicitly
include the shares of water stock. However, Utah courts ignored this mandate,
eventually holding that shares of water stock are interests in real property that are
automatically included in land transfers. This section discusses the five major court
cases in which Utah common law eclipsed Utah statutory law.
In 1954, the Utah Supreme Court heard Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co.,55
in which a buyer contracted to purchase two tracts of land and alleged that their
purchase included 112 shares of water stock.56 The contract stated that the land was
49

Supra Section II.B.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(4)(a) (West 2019).
51
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(4)(b) (West 2019) (referencing UTAH CODE ANN. § 731-10(2) (West 2019)).
52
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6a-606 (West 2019).
53
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(1)(a) (West 2019).
54
Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah 1982).
55
Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 269 P.2d 859 (Utah 1954).
56
Id. at 860.
50

218

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

to be purchased “together with water right [sic] appurtenant thereto,” but the contract
made no specific mention of any appurtenant water rights.57 Thirty-six years before
the Brimm lawsuit, Anderson, the then-owner of the two tracts of land and
appurtenant water rights, organized the Mendon Central Irrigation Company
(“MCIC”).58 By creating this company, Anderson “sold, assigned, transferred,
conveyed and confirmed unto the [MCIC] all [his] right, title and interest in and to
the springs and the waters arising therefrom” in exchange for certificates of stock in
MCIC.59 The issue in Brimm was whether the current buyer’s purchase of the land
included the shares of MCIC water stock that the buyer assumed to be appurtenant
to the land, despite the absence of the shares of MCIC stock in the purchase contract.
At the time the court heard Brimm, 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 read: “[w]ater
rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of stock in a corporation, in which case
water shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land.”60 Despite this language,
the Brimm court held that the shares of water stock were appurtenant to the land that
the buyer purchased. The Brimm court reasoned that 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 only:
[E]stablish[es] a rebuttable presumption that a water right represented by
shares of stock in a corporation [does] not pass to the grantee as an
appurtenance to the land upon which the water right was used, but that the
grantee could overcome such presumption if he could show by clear and
convincing evidence that said water right was in fact appurtenant and that
the grantor intended to transfer the water right with the land, even though
no express mention of any water right was made in the deed.61
As suggested by the Brimm court’s slippery language—consistently using the term
“water right” when the water at issue was represented by shares of MCIC stock—
this holding conflates the separate entities. Under the Brimm analysis, the
independent legal status of water, whether a right or share of stock, is largely
irrelevant because the water’s legal status is secondary to whether the grantor
intended the water to transfer with the land as an appurtenance. In other words,
Brimm reduced 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 to a presumption that shares of water
stock are not included in a land conveyance, which may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence showing that the grantor intended that the sale includes water,
regardless of the water’s legal status as shares of water stock.
The Brimm court justified its conclusion that the shares of MCIC water stock
were appurtenant to the sold land by using two points of reasoning to determine
whether the grantor intended for the sales contract to include the water, despite the
57

Id. at 861.
Id. at 860–61.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
61
Id. at 864.
58
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contract itself lacking specific mention of the MCIC stock. The Brimm court held
that the grantor did intend to transfer the MCIC stock with the land conveyance
because: (1) “the water had been used to irrigate the land [for sixty-four years],” and
(2) “[t]he land had little value without the water.”62 The Brimm court developed
these factors from precedent pre-dating 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 in the case of In
re Johnson’s Estate,63 which held, inter alia, that the length of time the shares of
water stock has been used on land and how that use benefits “this arid country” are
the most significant factors in resolving ownership disputes of shares of water
stock.64 Ultimately, the Brimm court reasoned that the grantor intended to transfer
the shares of water stock not included in the real estate purchase contract because
the shares of water had been used on the land for an extended period of time and the
value of the land was increased proportionally to the amount of water stock allegedly
included in the purchase.
As commented by Justice Henriod in his dissent, the Brimm holding weakened
the effect of 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10, which, in turn, obfuscates whether a transfer
of land includes water stock not expressly included in a purchase contract to “a
matter of presumption and proof.”65 Unlike the statutory mandate that shares of
water stock “shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land,”66 Brimm gave courts
the flexibility to determine whether shares of water stock are included in a land
conveyance transfer on an ad hoc basis. The Brimm decision began a trend of Utah
courts determining whether shares of water stock are appurtenant to land by
inconsistently applying the two primary Brimm factors,67 rather than adhering to the
statutory mandate that shares of water stock are not appurtenant to land.68 This
ultimately led to Utah courts completely disregarding Utah statutes regulating the
transfer of shares of water stock and the fulfillment of Justice Henriod’s prophetic
dissent that ownership of water stock “may depend on presumption or the lack of
it.”69
Four years after Brimm, the Utah Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether
shares of water stock are included in a land conveyance that does not explicitly
enumerate the shares of water stock allegedly included in the sale in Hatch v.
Adams.70 Unlike Brimm, the Hatch court held that the shares of water stock did not
transfer with the real estate because the grantor did not clearly and convincingly
intend to convey the shares of water stock with the land. In Hatch, the defendant62

Id.
In re Johnson’s Estate, 228 P. 748 (Utah 1924).
64
Id. at 752.
65
Brimm, 269 P.2d at 864.
66
Id. at 863.
67
Utah courts never expressly identify these points as factors, rather they are points of
reasoning that are consistently used to support holdings. The author uses the term “factor”
for convenience and clarity.
68
Brimm, 269 P.2d at 863.
69
Id. at 865.
70
Hatch v. Adams, 318 P.2d 633, 633 (Utah 1957).
63
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seller sold real estate to the plaintiff-buyer. The sales contract sold the farm land
“[t]ogether with all buildings and improvements thereon and all water rights [sic]71
appurtenant thereto” followed by a list of shares of water stock included in the sale.72
Following the sale, the plaintiff-buyer argued that he owned an additional seven and
one-half shares of stock not included in the contract because the seven and one-half
shares of water were allegedly appurtenant to the sold land.73 The Supreme Court of
Utah affirmed the trial court’s finding that the seven and one-half shares were not
appurtenant to the land and thus not included in the sale.74
Despite the seemingly obvious decision that shares of water stock not included
in the sales contract were not sold, the Hatch decision is significant because the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision by applying only the first of the
two Brimm factors. Again, the Brimm court held that 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10
“establish[es] a rebuttable presumption that a water right represented by shares of
stock in a corporation [does] not pass to the grantee as an appurtenance to the land
upon which the water right was used.”75 The Brimm court held that the buyer had
rebutted this presumption by providing evidence that: (1) “the water had been used
to irrigate the land [for sixty-four years],” and (2) “[t]he land had little value without
the water.”76 Conversely, the Hatch court held the buyer failed to rebut the
presumption that seven and one-half shares of water stock in question were not
appurtenant to the land, and thus not included in the land conveyance.77 Instead of
engaging both Brimm factors, the Hatch court reasoned that “proof that water
represented by water stock was used on certain land by the owner of the land during
the entire period of his ownership of the land is not alone sufficient to rebut the
presumption that such water is not to be deemed appurtenant [to the sold land].”78
While this holding concedes that the first Brimm factor is not satisfied, it
simultaneously reduces the weight of that factor by concluding that evidence of use
of the shares of water stock on the land alone is insufficient to rebut the presumption
that shares of water stock are not appurtenant to land when the land is transferred.
Further, the Hatch court failed to determine whether the seven and one-half
shares of water stock would increase the value of the land if they were appurtenant
to the land. By failing to consider how the value of the land would change if the
shares of water stock in question where appurtenant to the land, the Hatch court
failed to guide future courts in weighing the Brimm factors. While the Hatch court
did consider that “other water was used on the land in question” besides the seven

71

The contract incorrectly used the term “water rights” instead of “shares of water

stock.”
72

Hatch, 318 P.2d at 633.
Id. at 634.
74
Id. at 635.
75
Brimm, 269 P.2d at 864.
76
Id.
77
Hatch, 318 P.2d at 634.
78
Id.
73
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and one-half of shares of water stock at issue,79 the court did not engage in a
discussion of whether the diligent right of the shares of water stock enumerated in
the contract satisfied the land’s needs, (i.e., its beneficial use), or if the other seven
and one-half shares of water stock would increase the land’s productivity, and
therefore its value. While the Hatch court’s holding is consistent with Utah statutory
law, which states that shares of water stock are not appurtenant to the land,80 it fails
to clarify why the Brimm presumption was not rebutted, which led to confusion in
future litigation.
Twenty-six years after Hatch, the Utah Supreme Court heard Abbott v.
Christensen,81 where the court awarded shares of water stock to Christensen—the
buyer.82 The Abbott court held that Christensen owned the shares of water stock in
question because Abbott (the seller) intended to sell the land with the shares of water
stock, over Abbott’s later objection. The Abbott court, relying on Brimm, held that
Christensen successfully rebutted the presumption that unmentioned shares of water
stock are not included in a land conveyance.83 However, the Abbott court’s reliance
on Brimm was in error because, as the Abbott court itself stated, the sales contract at
issue did include the shares of water stock, albeit vaguely.
Abbott and Christensen were engaged in a joint venture in which Christensen
lived on Abbott’s ranch and cared for Abbott’s cattle, with the parties splitting the
profits from sold calves fifty-fifty.84 Upon the termination of this joint venture,
Christensen received part of Abbott’s real property, as governed by a contract
prepared by Abbott.85 The contract, however, made no specific mention of the shares
of water stock that had historically been used to irrigate the conveyed real estate.86
After Abbott sold the land to Christensen, Abbott alleged that the sales contract did
not include “424 shares of stock in the Farnsworth Canal Irrigation Company” that
were historically used to irrigate the sold land.87 Abbott argued that the sale could
not have included the shares of Farnsworth water stock because under 73 Utah Code
Ann. § 1-10 shares of water stock are not appurtenant to land, and only the land was
spoken of in the contract.88 The trial court awarded Christensen the real estate and
the 424 shares of stock in the Farnsworth Canal Irrigation Company.89
Abbott appealed the trial court’s application of the law. He argued that the plain
language of 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 proscribed automatic inclusion of shares of
water stock in a real estate conveyance when the stock in question is not expressly
79

Id.
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mentioned in the contract. Abbott argued that whether the shares of water stock in
question are appurtenant to the conveyed land is irrelevant when determining
whether shares of water stock are included in a land conveyance because under Utah
statutory law shares of water stock “shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the
land . . . .”90 Abbott also cited both Brimm and Hatch to support his argument that
conveyances of land do not include water when the water is represented by shares
of water stock in a water company, and those shares are not expressly included in
the contract.91 Abbott further claimed the trial court’s consideration of the amount
of time the shares of Farnsworth stock were historically used on Christensen’s real
estate was irrelevant because, under Hatch, proof of water use “by the owner of the
land during the entire period of his ownership of the land is not alone sufficient to
rebut the presumption that such water is not to be deemed appurtenant.”92
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Abbott’s arguments. The court reasoned that
the shares of water stock were appurtenant to the land in part because “the water at
issue had been used on the land for over forty years, a period much longer than the
current ownership” and that “[a]s in Brimm, this land would have comparatively
little value without the water.”93 The court continued, reasoning that the 424 shares
of stock in the Farnsworth Canal Irrigation Company were appurtenant to the land
because Abbott did not contest their appurtenant status until two years after the land
conveyance contract was signed as “a counter in the larger and evolving controversy
between the parties.”94
Although the ultimate decision in Abbott was correct, considering, inter alia,
this lawsuit was a fraudulent counter to developments in a greater suit; the Abbott
court inappropriately applied the Brimm rebuttable presumption to 73 Utah Code
Ann. § 1-10. In Brimm, the issue that prompted the need to rebut 73 Utah Code Ann.
§ 1-10 was the fact that the court could not determine what water the contract
referenced. 95 In Abbott, the contract between Abbott and Christensen did mention
the shares of water stock, just not by name. The real estate conveyance contract
included a provision that stated, “if the said Buyers shall . . . fail to pay the taxes or
water assessments on the said property when the same shall become due, then [after
notice Sellers may declare the agreement void and Buyers forfeit all rights].”96 In
analyzing this provision, the Abbott court reasoned that “there was no water to which
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the above provision could have referred except the 434 [sic]97 shares of Farnsworth
stock involved in this controversy.”98 The land conveyance between Abbott and
Christensen, therefore, did not merit analysis of the Brimm rebuttable presumption
to 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 because this rebuttable presumption is triggered when
“no express mention of any water right [sic]99 is made in the deed.”100
In Abbott, whether the shares of the stock were appurtenant to the land was
irrelevant because the contract discussed the shares of Farnsworth stock in the sale.
Rather than relying on the Brimm rebuttable presumption that shares of water stock
not included in real estate conveyance contracts are not transferred as appurtenances
to conveyed real estate, the Abbott court should have determined that the shares of
stock were severed from the land yet included in the land conveyance to Christensen
through the contract. Under this analysis, the Abbott court would still have reached
the fair result of Christensen (the buyer) retaining the real estate and the shares of
water stock. Instead, the Abbott court further weakened the statutory mandate that
shares of water stock are not appurtenant to real estate by applying the Brimm
rebuttable presumption to 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 and holding that “Christensen
rebutted the statutory presumption by clear and convincing evidence, and acquired
ownership of the irrigation company stock under the real estate contract.”101
The Abbott holding is particularly problematic because there was conflicting
evidence regarding whether the land’s value increased if the shares of Farnsworth
stock were appurtenant to the land at the trial court level.102 Under the second prong
of Brimm, a piece of land’s comparative value with or without the shares of water
influences whether the shares of water stock are appurtenant to the land.103 When
the evidence shows that the shares of water stock in question were used on the land
and this use increases the land’s value, courts favor a finding that the shares of water
stock are appurtenant to land. At trial, Abbott argued that the Farnsworth stock was
not appurtenant to the land because the value of the land was the same with or
without the water.104 Abbott testified that the value of the land in 1974 without the
Farnsworth stock was the same price that Christensen paid when he purchased the
land on December 21, 1974.105 Conversely, Christensen testified that the first 1974
value did not represent the value of the land without the water, “but simply the
amount Abbott originally paid for the property, plus interest” because the parties
97

It is unclear whether the dispute was over 424 or 434 shares of Farnsworth stock
because the opinion uses both amounts. However, the difference of ten shares one way or
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Abbott, 660 P.2d at 257.
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agreed that Abbott would not profit from the sale of the land.106 Although it was not
an error for the Utah Supreme Court to accept the district court’s favorable weight
of Christensen’s testimony, the Abbott court’s holding provides no analysis to guide
future courts in their application of the second Brimm factor.
The ultimate result in Abbott is correct, but the court used the wrong legal tools
to reach a sound conclusion. The Abbott court’s unnecessary application of the
Brimm rebuttable presumption to 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 is problematic because
it leads to further confusion for future courts when applying the Brimm rebuttable
presumption in light of the mandatory language of 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10.107
A mere four months after Abbott, the Utah Supreme Court fell prey to its
precedential confusion regarding the application of the Brimm factors while deciding
Roundy v. Coombs.108 In Roundy, a father conveyed all of his land and two shares of
stock in the Boulder Irrigation Company to his son.109 Later, the father conveyed a
homesite parcel of the same land to his daughter.110 To effectuate this sale, the son
relinquished the homesite parcel by executing a quitclaim deed to the land in favor
of his father, who then executed a warranty deed to the property in favor of the
daughter.111 None of the deeds or corresponding sales documents made any mention
of the transfer of the two shares of stock in the Boulder Irrigation Company to the
daughter.112 Further, the daughter did not pay any of the stock assessments for the
two shares of Boulder Irrigation Company stock; rather, the son paid these
obligations.113 Years later, the Boulder Irrigation Company abandoned its ditch
system in favor of a water pipeline that bypassed the sister’s homesite, thereby
preventing the sister from using the two shares of water to irrigate her land.114 The
parties disputed whether the plaintiff-sister could continue to use the water,
represented by two shares of stock in the Boulder Irrigation Company that the
defendant-brother claimed to own.115 The trial court awarded the two shares of water
to the sister. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed in favor of the brother.116
On appeal, the plaintiff-sister argued that the trial court’s award of the two
shares of stock was correct under the precedent in Brimm because the water had been
106
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used on the homesite for many years and “that there was an understanding of all
parties that there was some water to be used upon the property.”117 The sister argued
that although her father’s deed to her did not expressly mention the shares of stock,
they were implicitly included in the deed because she consistently used the water to
irrigate her land when her brother was not using the same shares of water to irrigate
his fields. This practice pre-dated her ownership of the homesite by thirty-nine
years.118
The Roundy court was not sympathetic to the sister’s arguments, holding that
the two shares of Boulder Irrigation Company water were not appurtenant to the
sister’s homesite.119 The Roundy court supported its holding by applying both of the
Brimm factors. First, the court followed the precedent set in Hatch120 that the use of
the shares of water alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that shares of
water stock are not appurtenant to land.121 Second, the Roundy court employed the
second Brimm factor (that shares of water are more likely appurtenant to land when
the value of the land is increased if the diligent right of the water stock is used on
the land) holding in favor of the brother. The Roundy court reasoned that the two
shares of water stock were not appurtenant to the homesite estate because “the value
of the homesite was not dependent upon the use of the water.”122 The Roundy court
reached this conclusion because the plaintiff-sister occasionally used water other
than the Boulder Irrigation Company water to irrigate her homesite, again, mirroring
the reasoning of the Hatch court.123 With neither Brimm factor satisfied, the Roundy
court reversed and held that the sister-plaintiff failed to carry her burden to rebut the
presumption that her conveyance of the homesite included the two shares of Boulder
Irrigation Company stock.124
The Roundy decision is strong evidence that the Utah Supreme Court employs
the Brimm factors loosely to reach subjectively fair conclusions, rather than strictly
117
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adhering to the Brimm factors as dispositive tools to determine whether shares of
water stock are actually appurtenant to land. In Brimm, the court held that the shares
of water stock were appurtenant to the land because: (1) the water had been used on
the property for sixty-four years, and (2) the land had little worth without the
water.125 On the other hand, in Roundy, the court held that the shares of water stock
were not appurtenant to the land despite the fact that: (1) the water in question was
used on the sister’s land for thirty-nine years,126 and, (2) the homesite was located in
the particularly arid location of Richfield, Utah.127
The Roundy court, following precedent, reduced the first Brimm factor to an
irrelevancy. In Roundy, the court concluded that the two shares of Boulder Irrigation
Company water were not appurtenant to the homesite even though this water was
used on the homesite property for at least thirty-nine years.128 The Roundy court,
quoting Hatch, reasoned that “proof that water represented by water stock was used
on certain land . . . is not alone sufficient to rebut the presumption that such water is
not to be deemed appurtenant.”129
However, this same argument influenced the court to take the opposite position
in Abbott. The Abbott court held that the shares of water stock were appurtenant to
the land in part because “the water at issue had been used on the land for over forty
years.”130 Again, the Roundy court held that the first Brimm factor was not satisfied
despite the consistent use of the two shares of Boulder Irrigation stock on the
homesite for at least thirty-nine years.131 Thus, the Utah Supreme Court used a
difference of approximately one year to justify contradictory results in Abbott and
Roundy. This suggests that Utah courts’ subjective palatability of the ultimate result
influences whether the first factor of Brimm is satisfied rather than the factor
determining whether shares of water stock transfer as appurtenances to land.
The Roundy court’s superficial application of the second Brimm factor further
suggests that the Utah Supreme Court manipulated the Brimm rebuttable
presumption to justify its desired ultimate result rather than as an objective formula
to determine the appurtenant status of shares of water stock to real estate. The
homesite in Roundy was in Richfield, Utah. Richfield receives approximately 8.48
to 8. 54 inches of rainfall per year.132 The amount of rainfall is significant because
the Utah Supreme Court held in the In re Johnson’s Estate case that “in this arid
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country, in most cases, ‘farm lands’133 are valueless without water.”134 This is
especially significant because, as discussed earlier, the Brimm court relied on the
precedent set in In re Johnson’s Estate while developing its two rebuttable
presumption factors.135
While the statutory laws governing the transfer of shares of water stock at the
time of In re Johnson’s Estate were more lenient in permitting shares of water stock
to be appurtenant to land than 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10,136 the In re Johnson’s
Estate court was persuaded that the shares of water stock were appurtenant to the
devised land, because of the land’s aridity.137 The court in In re Johnson’s Estate
reasoned that “[i]t is inconceivable that the testator in this case intended to devise . . .
farm land and not include the water rights, [sic]138 upon the use of which depends
the enjoyment and value of the property.”139 In re Johnson’s Estate, therefore,
suggests that whether a piece of land is worth more when coupled with shares of
water stock is the most significant factor in determining whether a grantor intended
that unmentioned shares of water stock be included in the sale of land as
appurtenances to the sold land. This is especially significant because the land in
question in In re Johnson’s Estate was located in Salt Lake County, which has an
average rainfall of 18.57 to 18. 58 inches per year.140
133

In re Johnson’s Estate does not define what types of land constitute “farm lands.”
The Roundy court may have been persuaded that the plaintiff-daughter’s estate, which was a
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the plaintiff-daughter used the two shares of water stock to irrigate her “garden, pasture and
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importance.
134
In re Johnson’s Estate, 228 P. 748, 752 (Utah 1924).
135
Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 269 P.2d 859, 862 (Utah 1954).
136
The statute governing the transfer of water stock when In re Johnson’s Estate was
heard is: By Laws Utah 1919, c. 67, section 16. This statute reads: “Water rights shall be
transferred by deeds, in substantially the same manner as real estate, except when they are
represented by shares of stock in a corporation, and such deeds shall be recorded in books
kept for that purpose.” The court interpreted this statute to mean: “[I]f the water right is
represented by shares of stock in a corporation, the plain implication is that it may be
transferred by a transfer of the certificate of stock, in the ordinary manner, as personal
property. But that does not necessarily mean that water rights thus represented may not be
an appurtenant to the land upon which the water is used, and pass as such with a conveyance
of the land.” In re Johnson’s Estate, 228 P. at 750–51.
137
Id. at 752.
138
The court erroneously uses the words “water rights” to represent 44 shares of the
capital stock of the Union & Jordan Irrigation Company. Id.
139
Id.
140
Climate Salt Lake City—Utah, U.S. CLIMATE DATA, https://www.usclimatedata.

228

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

The fact that Richfield County receives approximately ten fewer inches of
rainfall than Salt Lake County suggests that the Roundy court was more concerned
with not granting the plaintiff-sister an unpurchased windfall than actually
determining whether the shares of water stock were appurtenant to the homesite. If
the Roundy court’s primary concern were whether the shares of water stock were
appurtenant to the land, the court likely would have held that the shares of water
stock were appurtenant to the plaintiff-daughter’s land after an objective application
of the two Brimm factors. First, the water in Roundy was used on the land for at least
thirty-nine years,141 approximately one year less than the acceptable amount of time
under Abbott,142 and second, the land was in an especially arid part of Utah.143
The Utah Supreme Court’s refusal to objectively apply Brimm’s rebuttable
presumption that shares of water stock are not appurtenant to land reached its apex
in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Cahoon & Maxfield Irr. Co.144 In Cahoon, Salt Lake and
Sandy cities transferred shares of water stock in violation of an irrigation company’s
articles of incorporation.145 Without making any reference to Brimm or its progeny
of cases outlined above, the Cahoon court ruled that the irrigation company’s articles
of incorporation governed any transactions involving the company’s shares of water
stock because “stock in a mutual irrigation corporation represents an interest in real
property and is therefore not a certificated security under [title 70A—the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code].”146 In essence, Cahoon eliminated the rebuttable
presumption that shares of water are not appurtenant to land and abrogated 73 Utah
Code Ann. § 1-10 by reasoning that shares of water stock are interests in real
property. Further, the Utah Supreme Court implied that shares of water stock, as real
property interests, are appurtenant to land because the court held that “ownership of
the shares of stock is merely incidental to the ownership of the [real property] water
rights [owned] by the shareholders.”147
Beginning with Brimm in 1954 to the 1994 decision in Cahoon, 73 Utah Code
Ann. § 1-10 was eroded by various Utah Common law court decisions. Water stocks
changed from being clearly defined as personal property that “shall not be deemed
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to be appurtenant to the land”148 to an entity that is inherently appurtenant to land as
an “interest in real property.”149 Thus, Utah common law obfuscated the once clear
distinction between water rights and shares of water stock, fulfilling Justice
Henriod’s prophetic dissent in which he stated that the Brimm decision would invoke
lawsuits where one’s ownership of water “may depend on presumption or the lack
of it.”150
IV. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE’S CLARIFICATION REGARDING HOW SHARES
OF WATER STOCK ARE TRANSFERRED
In direct response to Cahoon, the Utah Senate passed House Bill 61 in 1996.151
After explicitly disagreeing with the result of Cahoon by name, Utah Representative
David Ure explained that under House Bill 61 “the water certificate itself . . . will be
classified as personal property and will be . . . governed under the same rules as the
Uniform Commercial Code” to ensure that financial institutions will know how to
protect their collateral.152 Specifically, House Bill 61 amended 73 Utah Code Ann.
§ 1-10 by adding subsection 2, which reads: “[t]he right to the use of water evidenced
by shares of stock in a corporation shall be transferred in accordance with the
procedures applicable to securities set forth in Title 70A, Chapter 8, Uniform
Commercial Code . . . .”153
The Utah legislature later emphasized how shares of water stock are transferred
under House Bill 61 by adding paragraph (b) to subsection (4) of 73 Utah Code Ann.
§ 1-11 which reads: “[o]n or after May 14, 2013, . . . the right to the use of water
evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall transfer only as provided in
Subsection 73-1-10(2).”154 When combined, the two amended statutes read: “[o]n or
after May 14, 2013, . . . the right to the use of water evidenced by shares of stock in
a corporation shall transfer only”155 “in accordance with the procedures applicable
to securities set forth in Title 70A, Chapter 8, Uniform Commercial Code-Investment Securities.”156 In other words, under House Bill 61 and the 2013
amendment to 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10, the Utah legislature mandated that shares
148
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of water stock shall transfer as personal property157 security interests under chapter
eight of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code to ensure that courts produce
predictable outcomes that allow for companies to protect the collateral that they hold
in the form of shares of water stock.158 These amendments unequivocally mandate
that shares of water stock are personal property that is explicitly governed by titles
70A and 73 of the Utah Code.
V. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO FOLLOW STATUTORY
LAW REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF SHARES OF WATER STOCK
Just one year after the Utah Legislature amended 73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-11,
the Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that a share of water stock is
governed under Title 70A of the Utah code in Southam v. S. Despain Ditch Co.159
The facts in Southam are similar to Cahoon. In Southam, a buyer bought shares of
water stock “in contravention of [the company’s] restrictions on transferability”
within the company’s articles of incorporation.160 The purchaser argued that under
Cahoon, shares of water stock are “interests in real property.”161 Accordingly, the
purchaser argued that the South Despain Ditch Company’s articles of incorporation
restricting transferability were void under the common law principle that restraints
on the alienability of real property are void.162
The Southam court ruled that the purchaser’s arguments failed on two grounds.
First, the court held that the transferability of the stock is “foreclosed or preempted
by the clear, comprehensive terms of . . . the Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act.”163
Second, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s argument that the corporation’s
restrictions on water stock transferability were a restraint on alienation of real
property was incorrect because “the transaction at issue is not the transfer of real
property interests in water; it is the transfer of shares of a nonprofit corporation.”164
While these holdings appear sound when viewed individually when compared
against each other, the court’s logic justifying its first holding violates the logic
needed to justify the second.
157
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In deciding that the stock could not be transferred because the transfer would
violate section 606 of the Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act, the court explained
that it was bound to adhere to the statutory restriction on the transferability of stock
under section 606 because “a legislative presumption of the general
nontransferability of nonprofit shares, . . . leaves little room for a judicial
determination that more limited restrictions are void as contrary to public policy”
and that “the expression of one [interpretation of law] should be interpreted as the
exclusion of another.”165
Therefore, under Southam, Brimm and its progeny of cases should be abrogated
because all these cases rely heavily on a judicial determination of law at the expense
of a legislative mandate. Namely, the Brimm decision that the statutory language
“shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land,” is only a presumption that may
be rebutted.166 However, rather than abrogating Brimm and the cases that follow in
its wake, Southam implicitly endorses the common law principle that shares of water
stock are more akin to real estate than personal property, thereby upholding the
Brimm rebuttable presumption. This is because Southam confirms the holding in
Cahoon that shares of water stock are “interest[s] . . . involving real property.”167
Moreover, the Southam holding that legislative presumptions trump contrary
judicial determinations abrogates Southam itself. As discussed above, the Southam
court endorsed the judicial determination in Cahoon that shares of water stock are
not securities. This endorsement of a judicial determination is contrary to a
legislative mandate, not just a presumption. Southam, repeating the holding in
Cahoon, stated, “we have rejected the argument that an interest in a mutual irrigation
company is a ‘security’ governed by our Investment Securities Act, Utah Code
section 70A–8–102(1), and in so doing have characterized the interest as one
involving real property.”168 The Southam court’s echo of Cahoon is blatantly
contrary to the legislation made in direct response to Cahoon; namely, that “the right
to the use of water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall transfer
only”169 “. . . in accordance with the procedures applicable to securities set forth in
Title 70A, Chapter 8, Uniform Commercial Code--Investment Securities.”170 By
upholding section 606 of the Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act and Cahoon, the
Southam court simultaneously embraced and condoned the idea that judicial
determinations may contradict legislative mandates.
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The Southam court’s preservation of the holding in Cahoon also contradicts its
own statements of law. Southam undercuts Cahoon by stating in a footnote that “the
Cahoon case can hardly be understood to establish the general applicability of real
property law in regulating interests in mutual irrigation companies,”171 despite the
Cahoon court expressly stating: “we hold that stock in a mutual irrigation
corporation represents a real property interest.”172 The Southam holding affirms that
shares of water stock are interests in real property, but suggests that real property
law principles are inapplicable to determine how these shares of water stock are
transferred because the Southam court held that “the transaction at issue is not the
transfer of real property interests in water; it is the transfer of shares of a nonprofit
corporation.”173
The Southam court, therefore, upholds two contradictory legal principles. First,
Southam forwards the position that Utah courts should “advance the public policies
enshrined in Utah statutes, and not to advance others that [the court] might find
controlling if [it] had a policymaking role,”174 while in the same breath abrogating
73 Utah Code Ann. § 1-10 by affirming the Cahoon court’s holding that shares of
water stock are not certified securities under 70A Utah Code Ann. § 8-102.175
Second, in a footnote Southam rejects the notion that real property common law
governs how shares of water stock are transferred because Southam declares that
“the Cahoon case can hardly be understood to establish the general applicability of
real property law in regulating interests in mutual irrigation companies,”176 even
though the Southam court itself “characterized [shares of water stock] as one
involving real property,” in the same footnote.177
Southam thus securely places shares of water stock in a state of complete legal
confusion. Southam abrogates Brimm and its progeny by holding that legislative
decisions silence judicial opposition on the same subject. However, it upholds
Brimm’s underlying message that shares of water stock are more akin to real
property than personal property. Further, Southam defends the integrity of Utah
statutes from judicial intervention by adhering to the Revised Nonprofit Corporation
Act. However, it completely defiles the statutory mandate that title 70A governs the
transfer of shares of water stock by reinforcing the holding from Cahoon, which
states precisely the opposite.
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VI. CONCLUSION
To date, it is not only unclear how shares of water stock in Utah should be
transferred, but also how priority to these shares of water stock is perfected. When
an instrument (such as a deed or a stock certificate) is perfected, it is executed and
filed with a public registry.178 Thus, the perfection of a water right, or share of water
stock, determines the priority under which water appropriators may draw their
diligent right in relation to other appropriators.179 Under Brimm, contested shares of
water stock are perfected like real estate, namely, by a judicial decree rebutting the
presumption that the shares of water stock are not appurtenant to land. Under the
principles of Cahoon and Southam, shares of water stock apparently are perfected
under real property laws subject to a “mutual irrigation corporation’s articles of
incorporation, if valid.”180 Under Title 70A of the Utah Code, a share of water stock,
as a security, is perfected by control.181 This occurs when the “security is delivered
to the purchaser,” like personal property.182 Therefore, Utah law allows an owner of
a share of water stock to establish their priority right to use water as the first in time
by: (1) buying the land which the water is appurtenant to, subject to the Brimm
factors; (2) creating a water company that includes articles of incorporation that
bestow the stock to the shareholder-owner, as determined by the Southam court; and
(3) possessing the stock certificate under Utah statutory law.
Furthermore, nonprofit mutually-owned water companies are difficult for
courts to regulate. Courts have reasoned that mutually-owned companies are beyond
the scope of anti-trust monopoly regulations because “the conflict of interest
between consumer and vendor are eliminated because the owners are both the buyers
and sellers of their own services.”183 Mutually-owned companies are not at risk to
monopolistic conflicts of interest, because if rates are low, consumers must accept
the diminished quality of services, or increase their payments to improve the
services.184 If rates become too high, the surplus is collected and returned to the
consumer-owners pro-rata.185 If consumer-owners are ever dissatisfied with the
services they receive, they “have it in their power to elect other directors and demand
certain changes.”186 Because mutual ownership of a company includes inherent
178
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checks and balances that discourage monopolistic behavior, courts have found that
“mutual ownership eliminates the policy justifications for regulation and such
government interference becomes unwarranted.”187
Courts are also hesitant to regulate mutually-owned nonprofit water companies
that are not classified as public utilities. Nonprofit mutually-owned water companies
are either public utilities or private companies.188 The Supreme Court of Utah
reasoned that “[t]he essential feature of a public use is that it is not confined to
privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefiniteness or
unrestricted quality that gives it its public character.”189 Conversely, a private
mutually-owned nonprofit water company only provides services to its members.190
Courts have declared that private mutually-owned nonprofit water companies are
not converted into public utilities even when the company’s shareholders permit the
general public to use the water that the shareholders’ own.191 This means that as
Utah’s population rapidly grows,192 the governing bodies that write the articles of
incorporation and bylaws of private nonprofit water companies will have a vast
amount of power to determine how their water is used, and these governing bodies
will likely be outside the scope of judicial oversight.
To solve these issues, the Utah Supreme Court should follow its directive and
“advance the public policies enshrined in Utah statutes.”193 As expressed by former
Rep. David Ure, to ensure that financial institutions will know how to protect their
collateral,194 when disputes arise regarding the transfer of shares of water stock, the
Utah Supreme Court should hold that shares of water stock “shall be transferred in
accordance with the procedures applicable to securities set forth in title 70A.”195
Further, the court should use areas of law outside of water law to render justice when
required. If the Utah Supreme Court follows its own mandate “that common law
must yield” when “a conflict arises between the common law and a statute or
187
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constitutional law,”196 individuals and corporations will know how to convey and
protect their water rights (which are real property), their shares of water stock (which
are personal property), and future litigants seeking to access water owned by private
nonprofit mutually-owned water companies will know what legal theories (real
property principles or principles governed by the Utah Uniform Commercial Code)
to use to persuade courts to provide favorable results that will ensure that Utahns
across the state will have the ability to beneficially use one of the state’s most
valuable resources.
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